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Abstract
Vehicle externalism maintains that the vehicles of our mental representations can be
located outside of the head, that is, they need not be instantiated by neurons located
inside the brain of the cogniser. But some disagree, insisting that ‘non-derived’, or
‘original’, content is the mark of the cognitive and that only biologically instanti-
ated representational vehicles can have non-derived content, while the contents of all
extra-neural representational vehicles are derived and thus lie outside the scope of the
cognitive. In this paper we develop one aspect of Menary’s vehicle externalist theory of
cognitive integration—the process of enculturation—to respond to this longstanding
objection. We offer examples of how expert mathematicians introduce new symbols
to represent new mathematical possibilities that are not yet understood, and we argue
that these new symbols have genuine non-derived content, that is, content that is not
dependent on an act of interpretation by a cognitive agent and that does not derive
from conventional associations, as many linguistic representations do.
Keywords Mental content · Representational vehicles · Vehicle externalism ·
Cognitive integration · Enculturation · Mathematical cognition
1 Introduction
Philosophers of mind have traditionally believed that our representations are instan-
tiated by states of the brain and, thus, located ‘internally’, or entirely in one’s head.
But more recently, vehicle externalists have challenged this tradition, instead main-
taining that representational vehicles can be located outside of the head. Although
there are now different strands of vehicle externalism (e.g., Menary 2007, 2015; Clark
B Karina Vold
kvv22@cam.ac.uk
1 Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, Faculty of Philosophy, Cambridge University,
Level One, 16 Mill Lane, Cambridge, UK
2 Department of Philosophy, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke St. West, Montreal, QC, Canada
123
3758 Synthese (2020) 197:3757–3777
and Chalmers 1998), most argue that environmental states and processes can be seam-
lessly integrated with the functions of our neural states and processes, making the
two—external and internal states and processes—equally essential for some aspects
our cognitive life. On this view, cognitive processes are not merely ‘scaffolded’ by tools
and structures in the environment (Vygotsky 1930)—they are partially constituted by,
rather than merely causally dependent on, external structures.
One common objection confronting vehicle externalism maintains that non-derived
content is the mark of the cognitive but no external representations could have
non-derived content—thus, no external representations could be genuinely cognitive
(Adams and Aizawa 2001, 2008, 2010; Aizawa and Adams 2005). In this paper, we
offer a new response to this longstanding objection by focusing on cases of math-
ematical cognition. Our strategy will be to grant non-derived content as a mark of
the cognitive but demonstrate that external representations—in particular, certain
mathematical symbols—can have non-derived content and should therefore count as
genuinely cognitive. Mathematicians sometimes rely on external markers as vehicles,
which they manipulate in computations in order to understand their content—a process
known as operative writing (Krämer 2003). Developing and understanding the content
of these symbols can be a long process involving a community of thinkers. We argue
that the contents of these symbols are not derived from any other representational state,
nor are they derived from purely conventional associations. Rather, they stand as an
example of external, non-biologically instantiated representations with non-derived
content.
2 Vehicle internalism and externalism
Traditional cognitive science subscribes to the view that whatever else is true of
cognitive processes, they take place entirely in the brain, such that (under the right
conditions) the operations of the brain could function independently of the wider body.
According to this view, known as internalism, mental representations, and the relevant
computations over these representations, are instantiated by states and processes of
the brain. As a consequence, this view allows for the possibility that a brain floating
in a vat could enjoy the same mental life as an embodied brain, despite being removed
from a biological body (Fodor 1980, 1981). Hence, while rejecting substance dualism
as a metaphysical position, traditional cognitive science still holds on to the Cartesian
idea that the mind is, in some sense, distinct from the body and the world it inhabits,
in the sense that it can be disassociated or separated from these external factors, at
least for the purpose of explanation.
A key distinction amongst varying internalist positions on mental representations
hinges on the difference between the vehicles and the contents. The vehicle of a rep-
resentation is the physical structure that represents, while the content is that which is
represented. Accordingly, vehicle internalism (also known as intracranialism) is the
view that all of the vehicles of our mental representations are within the skull, while
content internalism argues that the contents of our mental representations are fixed, or
determined, by properties of our brains. Burge (1979) famously argues against con-
tent internalism, developing Putnam’s (1975) twin-earth arguments against semantic
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internalism. Vehicle internalism, on the other hand, has only met popular challenges
and rival views more recently, including Menary’s (2007) theory of cognitive integra-
tion and Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) extended mind thesis, among other views.1 The
central argument in the present paper defends vehicle externalism from the common
objection that external representations could not have cognitive content. To this end,
it is worth noting that the vehicle internalist/externalist distinction is often thought
to vary independently of the content internalist/externalist positions (Chalmers 2008;
Theiner 2011). As we will see, however, the popular objection confronting vehicle
externalism that we focus on has to do with the nature of the content that is repre-
sented by the vehicles of mental representations. As a result, the relations between
vehicles and their contents become important for our argument.
3 Vehicle externalism: the extendedmind thesis, cognitive
integration, and enculturation
There are different versions of vehicle externalism, and for the sake of brevity we focus
on two in particular. The first is Clark and Chalmers’s extended mind thesis. Given that
it was this thesis against which the objection we respond to in this paper—the objection
from non-derived content—was originally lodged, an introduction of this view will
set the stage for the present discussion. But, as will see, this objection applies to all
versions of vehicle externalism. The second view of vehicle externalism we discuss is
Menary’s theory of cognitive integration. Menary’s theory helps to provide a way of
responding to the objection from non-derived content.
3.1 Clark and Chalmers’s extendedmind thesis
Clark and Chalmers’s extended mind thesis maintains that our mental states and cog-
nitive processes can be instantiated by physical states outside our brain and body.2
Defenders of this thesis accept the computational theory of mind but argue that when
we use tools, such as a pen and paper or a calculator, they can become seamlessly inte-
grated into our cognitive processes, such that computations (that is, the manipulations
of representations in accordance with formal rules) in the tools are just as essential to
our cognition as the computations in our brain. In this sense, the tool ‘extends’ our cog-
nition. Put more precisely, the information-bearing structures within the tool are the
vehicles of genuine mental representations, as are the vehicles of neurally instantiated
mental representations. Vehicle internalism (henceforth ‘intracranialism’) is there-
fore rejected. To motivate support for their view, Clark and Chalmers (1998) offer the
following principle:
1 Other versions of vehicle externalism have been defended by philosophers such as Chemero (2009),
Clark (1996), Hurley (1998a, b, 2010), Hutchins (1995), Noë (2004), Palermos (2014), Rowlands (2010),
Wheeler (2005), and Wilson (1994, 2004).
2 Some maintain that cognitive states and processes are a subset of mental states and processes, while
others insist that the two sets overlap. We do not take a position on this issue but use the terms ‘cognitive’
and ‘mental’ as interchangeable.
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If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which,
were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part
of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the
cognitive process. (p. 8)
Many now refer to this as Clark and Chalmers’s ‘parity principle,’ while others call
it the ‘fair treatment principle’ (e.g., Sprevak 2009; Drayson 2010), as it maintains
that we should treat equivalent processes with “the parity they deserve” irrespective
of whether they are internal or external to the skull (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 8).
Armed with their parity principle, Clark and Chalmers describe a case in which, they
argue, an object in the environment plays the same role for one agent that neurons in
the brain (something we would surely count as a part of the supervenience base of the
mind) do for another. The case involves two people, Inga and Otto. Inga decides to
go to an exhibition at the museum; to do so, “[s]he thinks for a moment and recalls
that the museum is on 53rd Street, so she walks to 53rd Street and goes into the
museum” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 12). Meanwhile, we imagine that Otto suffers
from Alzheimer’s disease and has to rely on information he stores in a notebook to
help structure his life. When he decides to go to the same exhibition, he consults his
notebook, where he has written the address and directions to get there. He then walks
to the museum and goes inside. Clark and Chalmers maintain that in the relevant
respects, the symbols in Otto’s notebook (i.e., the words on the page) function just as
the internal representational vehicles in Inga’s brain that constitute an ordinary belief,
and so both should count equally as part of the constitutive machinery of their beliefs.
Further, since beliefs are widely considered a part of one’s mind, it follows that a
part of Otto’s mind is constituted by a resource located outside of his brain. It is in
this sense that Clark and Chalmers maintain that our minds can extend beyond our
biological bodies.
3.2 Menary’s theory of cognitive integration
Menary’s theory of cognitive integration shares the commitment to vehicle external-
ism and the rejection of intracranialism, but it has a different aim and scope from
the extended mind thesis. Cognitive integration explains how our minds become
enculturated, where enculturation refers to the transformation of biological faculties
through the period of cognitive development, learning-driven neural plasticity, and cul-
tural environments (Menary 2015). The ‘cultural environment’ includes our cognitive
practices, mathematical and linguistic symbols, and complicated social worlds—what
philosophers now refer to as our ‘cognitive niche.’3 Cognitive practices include the
cultural formalization of patterns of action across populations and groups, and these
are, crucially, brought about through the creation and manipulation of representa-
tional vehicles (or information-bearing structures) in public spaces, that is, ‘external’
spaces (Menary 2007, p. 4). Menary (2015) uses the case of mathematical cognition
as a primary example of enculturation. We will focus on two concepts that charac-
3 Sterelny (2003) describes the cognitive niche as the structured environment that humans have created
(both the immediate niche that we create for ourselves and that which is created by others in the past and
present) and that enhances our cognition in ways that are often transparent to us—as culture often is.
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terize the process of enculturation that are most important for our later discussion of
mathematical cognition: evolutionary continuity and transformation.4
Evolutionary continuity refers to the gradual progress of evolution that takes place
through complex structures, including cultural, social, biological, neural, and genetic
structures, among others, over many generations. Much research has been done on
the evolutionary continuity of human brains from our archaic predecessors and even
lower primates.5 But enculturation focuses on another sense of evolutionary continuity,
which is key to understanding current mathematical practices, namely, the continuity
between biology and culture. Humans are born into highly structured mathematical
cultures that contain representational systems, such as numeral systems, that embody
knowledge, as well as practices and methods for manipulating these representations
(Ferreirós 2015; Larvor 2016). A budding mathematician does not invent a new num-
ber system; she learns the skills and practices of her cognitive niche and then learns
methods for attaining new knowledge (Menary and Kirchhoff 2014). Menary (2015)
sees these cultural practices as intertwined with our biological capacities: together
they allow for mathematical cognition. He refers to this kind of evolutionary continu-
ity as ‘cultural evolution’. Crucially, cognitive practices are the products of cultural
evolution, which can evolve over much faster timescales than biology. Thus, cultural
evolution can allow for new cognitive practices to emerge without being slowed down
by biological adaptations. Menary’s appeal to cultural evolution indicates how his
theory of cognitive integration offers a multi-layered approach to understanding cog-
nition—one that considers the unique contributions of the body, environment, culture,
and evolution, in addition to the brain.6 In doing so it also commits to the claim that
4 Menary (2015) focuses on four different aspects of enculturation—evolutionary continuity, transforma-
tion, learning-driven neural plasticity, and novelty or uniqueness. The first two play a role in our argument
addressing Adams and Aizawa’s objection to vehicle externalism, while the latter two do not. But because
the concepts of neural plasticity and novelty or uniqueness are also central to enculturation, we will briefly
touch on them here. First, neural plasticity highlights the role of developmental plasticity in the human
brain, through Hebbian synaptic plasticity, growth of grey matter, and subsequent pruning during criti-
cal periods. What is key for our purposes is that developmentally plastic human brains need cognitively
scaffolded environments to learn complex cognitive practices and techniques, including but not limited to,
mathematical practices. Menary’s concept of novelty, or uniqueness, emphasizes how external symbols and
tools do not merely replace, or substitute for, our internal cognitive capacities but can also give as new, novel
cognitive capacities. This could be said of basic tools such as an axe, which allows us to chop things our
hands alone could not chop. But this could also be said of other basic technologies such as writing utensils,
which allow us to create finely grained external symbols that allow us to publicly represent equally finely
grained concepts. The development of mathematical cognition relies on all four features of enculturation:
evolutionary continuity, behavioural and neural plasticity, transformation, and novelty or uniqueness.
5 Notably, Menary (2015, p. 6) is more cautionary about evolutionary claims that draw links between human
brains and lower primates.
6 The cognitive integration framework, thus, does not focus on the brain as the centre of a cognitive system.
This point helps to distinguish the scope of Menary’s view from that of Clark and Chalmers’s. According
to Menary (2015, p. 12), brains are unique insofar as they make their own distinctive contributions to our
cognitive life, but understanding human cognition requires looking at the ‘hybrid and multi-layered system’
that brings it about. This includes the distinctive processing of the brain, body, environment, and evolution.
Comparatively, the extended mind thesis is rather brain-centred, as it takes the brain to be at the centre of the
extended cognitive system. According to Clark (2003, 2011), brains are special because of (a) the central
role they play in bringing about our mental lives and (b) their ability to integrate with non-biological props
and aids. Thus, although it is compatible with the cognitive integration approach, Clark and Chalmers’s
parity argument does not pay the same attention to evolutionary processes or cultural practices.
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the representational vehicles of an organism’s cognitive states and processes are fun-
damentally integrated with environmental states and processes, such that the ‘inner’
and ‘outer’ form a single, unified cognitive system.
A second concept that characterizes the process of enculturation is the ‘transfor-
mation thesis’. As Menary (2015) articulates the thesis: ‘[C]ognitive transformations
occur when the development of the cognitive capacities of an individual are sculpted by
the cultural and social niche of that individual’ (p. 8). The manipulations of mathemat-
ical symbols, such as numerals and operators, are governed by culturally established
cognitive norms, which mathematicians must learn in order to engage in correct math-
ematical practices. It is through learned norms about how to correctly manipulate
inscriptions that mathematicians are able to grasp the content of newly introduced
mathematical symbols. For Menary, this demonstrates a transformation of our cogni-
tive—not biological—capacities. Our cognitive capacities are also transformed by the
use of mathematical symbols and axioms. These external structures are not just needed
for scaffolding during the learning process and then removed after the new cognitive
capacities are in place. Rather, mathematical symbols and practices are permanent
devices—or extensions—that even the most expert mathematicians rely on in their
cognitive practices, even if these are internalized (Schlimm 2018). These symbols and
axioms thus transform how mathematical cognition occurs.7
Insofar as cognitive integration and the extended mind thesis both commit to vehicle
externalism, they face a similar set of objections. Perhaps the most significant objection
is that our cognition is merely causally dependent upon, rather than partially constituted
by, external states and processes. As we will explain, this line of objection risks a
stalemate unless one side can provide a principled reason (i.e., one that does not beg
the question) for preferring the causal claim to the constitutive claim, or vice versa. It
is this debate that has led proponents of intracranialism to advocate for non-derived
content as a ‘mark of the cognitive’, as a way of deciding how to draw a non-question-
begging line between the mind (for them, the brain) and the world. We will argue
against this proposed mark of the cognitive by developing an aspect of Menary’s ideas
on mathematical cognition as a response to this objection.
4 Alternative views: is themind extended or embedded?
The distinction between the mere causal dependence of inner and outer resources
and the constitutive involvement of outer resources is what distinguishes the embed-
ded theory of cognition from the stronger vehicle externalism view.8 The embedded
account maintains that a cognitive system may crucially depend on the complexity
7 This point further distinguishes the cognitive integration version of vehicle externalism from that of
Clark’s position, which does not maintain that our basic cognitive resources are transformed. Clark instead
thinks that our biological resources ‘simply dovetail’ to public symbols (Menary 2015, p. 9). Arguably,
this makes it difficult for Clark’s account to explain the learning process for cognitive tasks that require the
manipulation of external symbols, such as mathematical cognitive tasks.
8 The view that Menary (2015, p. 2) calls the ‘moderate embedded mind thesis’ is what we refer to simply
as the ‘embedded mind thesis’, while what Menary refers to as the ‘embedded mind strong’ we call vehicle
externalism.
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of its environment but that the environment is not an actual part of the mind.9 Simon
(1969), for example, argues that much of the apparent complexity of cognitive systems
is actually external to the agent and residing in the environment. On this view, cogni-
tive systems lean heavily on worldly complexity without internalizing it. For example,
humans sometimes structure their own environment to store information and then rely
on these external structures instead of on internal resources. The embedded account
would explain Otto’s interaction with his notebook in these terms: Otto writes into
his notebook, thereby structuring his environment, and then relies on these external
information-bearing structures to get around the world instead of relying on his internal
resources. For Otto, this might be necessary because his internal information-bearing
structures (i.e. neurons in his brain) are no longer reliable—but we could imagine that
Inga, who does not suffer from Alzheimer’s, also decides to rely on a notebook instead
of her own well-functioning internal resources. The mise en place method of lining up
one’s ingredients in the correct order for cooking, for instance, is often used by chefs
to spare them the task of remembering the ordering of their recipes while cooking
(Kirsh 1995; Clark 2008). The embedded view of cognition tells us that in order to
understand and explain cognitive processes, such as the chef’s use and processing of
information while cooking, cognitive science cannot just study the internal processes
of computation instantiated in the brain. Instead, we must study the way that struc-
tures in the local environment of an agent facilitate the success of the agent’s internal
processes. Thus, the embedded view offers an explanatory, or epistemic, reason to
look beyond the brain, but it does not make any substantial constitutive claim—it
does not challenge the metaphysical view that the brain wholly constitutes the mind
(Rowlands 2010). The embedded view would say that all of Otto and Inga’s beliefs
are in their head, and Otto thus lacks any belief about where the museum is located.
If Inga cannot recall where the museum is located and has to retrieve this information
from her own notebook, then she too would lack a belief about where the museum
is located, whereas if she stored the information internally, then she would have that
belief. The key difference then is that embedded mind theorists accept intracranialism,
while extended mind theorists reject it.
Vehicle externalists tend to think that the embedded view risks triviality since
almost everyone agrees that the mind is in some sense causally reliant on both the
body and the extra-bodily world. Embedded mind theorists, on the other hand, argue
that there is no good reason for preferring the stronger constitutive claim to the more
conservative causal-dependence claim.10 Thus, a stalemate looms unless we can find
a way to arbitrate between these two views. Clark and Chalmers (1998) maintain that
the burden of proof lies with those who reject the constitutive claim—they must offer
a principled reason for insisting that all mental states are entirely constituted by neural
resources and only causally supported by extra-neural ones. Simply pointing to the
skull as the relevant boundary would amount to begging the question. To this end,
9 Advocates of the embedded view include, for example, Sterelny (2003, 2010; although he allows that
there may be limited cases of genuine cognition extension) and Adams and Aizawa (2008), who accept the
embedded claim but argue against cognitive extension.
10 For more on the debate between these two positions, see Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2008), Shapiro
(2010), Sterelny (2010), and Clark (2008, 2010).
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Adams and Aizawa (2001) argue that non-derived content is the distinguishing ‘mark
of the cognitive’.
5 Objection from non-derived content
In response to Clark and Chalmers’s argument for vehicle externalism, Adams and
Aizawa (2001, 2008, 2010) counter that there is a ‘mark of the cognitive’ that dis-
tinguishes representations that are genuinely cognitive from those that are not. A
necessary condition for a state or process to be cognitive, they argue, is for it to
bear non-derived content—sometimes called ‘original’ or ‘intrinsic’ content.11 Thus,
all cognitive states represent intrinsically, while non-cognitive representational states
derive their meanings from conventions, social practices, or the representational states
of cognitive agents, which are themselves not derived from anything.12 Exactly how
neural states come to have non-derived content has been one of the major topics for
debate in philosophy of cognitive science over the last few decades. Adams and Aizawa
(2001, p. 48) acknowledge that there is no consensus, nor do they take a position on
this issue, but they maintain there is ‘a fairly broad consensus that cognition involves
non-derived content’. They further maintain that, as a matter of contingent fact, our bio-
logically instantiated mental representations are the only things with intrinsic content.
They thus label themselves ‘contingent intracranialists’: while vehicle externalism is
logically possible, they maintain that the world happens to be such that there are no
actual cases of it.
To illustrate the notion of intrinsic content, let us return to the case of Otto and
Inga. The words in Otto’s notebook derive their content either through conventional
associations or from his own internal and biologically instantiated representational
capacities,13 such as his (internal) cognitive states, whereas Inga’s belief does not
represent the location of the museum by virtue of any convention or social practices.
Her neural states carry this content in some other, more direct way (again, exactly how
neural states carry meaning is an issue of controversy). Like the symbols in Otto’s
notebook, all other external representations lack intrinsic content, at least according
to Adams and Aizawa. Thus, the non-derived content condition provides a principled
reason for preferring intracranialism and the causal-dependence claim of the embed-
ded mind thesis, to the constitutive claim made by the extended mind thesis. Cognitive
11 Adams and Aizawa (2001, pp. 48–53) defend non-derived content as a necessary condition for a state
or process to be cognitive, along with the condition that cognitive processes are causally individuated. The
objection we are concerned with in this paper stems from the first necessary condition only. This objection
maintains that external states and processes do not have non-derived content and therefore are not cognitive.
12 In fact, Adams and Aizawa (2001, p. 49) are careful to distinguish the condition that cognitive processes
must involve non-derived content from the thesis of representationalism. Thus, a stronger condition for the
mark of the cognitive would be a conjunction of non-derived content and representationalism, which would
maintain that cognition necessarily involves representations that have non-derived content. Adams and
Aizawa believe in this stronger claim as well, but do not avail themselves of it. We will discuss this stronger
claim as the mark of the cognitive because vehicle externalists also tend to endorse representationalism,
as their position maintains that the vehicles of mental representations can be external to the biological
organism.
13 These two senses of ‘derived’ in fact need to be pulled apart, a point which we will discuss towards the
end of the paper.
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processes may be causally supported by non-neural states and processes, but all and
only cognitive states and processes have non-derived content.14 This is the objection
from non-derived content that Adams and Aizawa use to defend contingent intracra-
nialism.15 Thus, if we grant Adams and Aizawa their proposed mark of the cognitive,
the challenge confronting vehicle externalist theories is to show not just the modal
claim that external representations could have non-derived content, but that they in
fact do, at least in some cases. If this can be shown, then contingent intracranialism
would be proven false.
6 Responses to the objection from non-derived content
Many have offered various replies to counter the objection from non-derived content.
First, some express scepticism that the distinction between derived and non-derived
content is even coherent (Dennett 1990, 1986; Prinz and Clark 2004; Clark 2005,
2010). Second, assuming the distinction is coherent, it would be question-begging
to assume a priori that only internal biological representations can have non-derived
content without some further reason explaining why this is (Prinz and Clark 2004;
Clark 2010). Third, even if one accepts the distinction between non-derived and derived
content and one accepts that external representations are incapable of non-derived
content, one could deny that non-derived content really is the mark of the cognitive
on the grounds that there could be genuinely cognitive, internal states whose content
is derived (see Clark 2005, 2010; Wheeler 2017). A fourth response is to grant non-
derived content as a mark of the cognitive but to argue that internal subprocesses with
non-derived content can work in conjunction with external subprocesses such that the
overarching external or extended cognitive process will involve computations over
representations with non-derived content, even if some of the content is derived (e.g.,
Clark 2008; Wheeler 2010a, b, 2014, 2017).
Notably, all of these strategies admit that the relevant external representations lack
non-derived content. The objective of this paper is to offer a new response to this long-
standing challenge. Our strategy will be to grant non-derived content as a mark of the
cognitive but argue that (at least some) external representations can have non-derived
content and, thus, can count as genuinely cognitive. One example of external represen-
tations with non-derived content are cases of social extension, where the mental states
of one individual are partially constituted by the mind of another agent. For example,
instead of relying on the representational states in his notebook, Otto might rely on
14 Adams and Aizawa’s claim is inspired by Searle’s (1980) more familiar distinction between intrinsic
and derived intentionality. Although Clark (2005) points out one main difference: for Searle intrinsic
intentionality applies to whole systems, while for Adams and Aizawa intrinsic content seems to be a feature
of the parts (namely the states or processes) of cognitive systems rather than to the whole. Clark further
argues that the concept of ‘intrinsic content’ is both unclear and a confused adaptation of Searle’s notion
of intrinsic intentionality. Our argument in this paper will charitably accept the notion of ‘intrinsic content’
as a necessary condition for cognition but argue that, even so, it still does not give grounds for rejecting
vehicle externalism.
15 Another version of this objection can be found in Fodor (2009), and a further discussion of the need
for a mark of the mental can be found in Rowlands (2009), who includes original content as a necessary
condition for cognition, along with three other necessary conditions.
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the representational states in Inga’s head, such as by asking her for directions to the
museum. This would require that Inga play a big part in Otto’s daily life, so that the
information in her head plays a similar functional role in Otto’s memory as it does in her
own. In this case, even though the representational vehicles are extracranial—external
to Otto’s brain—they would still have non-derived content. But in this case the repre-
sentational states in Inga’s head are still biologically instantiated and thus, according
to Adams and Aizawa’s view, should have non-derived content. Our argument will
challenge this neuro-chauvinistic commitment by arguing that non-biologically instan-
tiated external symbols can also have non-derived content. Our focus will be on what
Menary describes as a primary example of enculturation—mathematical cognition.
First, it is helpful to recall the distinction made earlier between content internal-
ism/externalism and vehicle internalism/externalism as this distinction is now useful
to the present debate. Notice that Adams and Aizawa appeal to a particular kind of
representational content—non-derived content—to reject vehicle externalism. But, as
mentioned earlier, it is widely agreed that the vehicle internalist/externalist distinction
varies independently of the content internalist/externalist positions (Chalmers 2008;
Theiner 2011). Making clear how this is possible is the first step in our response to
the objection from non-derived content.
7 Extended internalism and active content externalism
Adams and Aizawa maintain that representations can have content that is either derived
or non-derived, and that (as a matter of contingent fact) only neurally instantiated
representational vehicles are capable of the latter. They then argue that because non-
derived content is a necessary condition for cognition, all non-neurally instantiated
representational vehicles are necessarily non-cognitive, and, thus, vehicle externalism
is false. We will argue that there can be cases of external vehicles with non-derived
content. To do this, we first need to make clear how content internalism/externalism
and vehicle internalism/externalism can be separated. Recall that content internalists
maintain that representational content is determined by properties of the individual.
But contingent intracranialists, like Adams and Aizawa, could endorse content exter-
nalism, the view that content is determined by more than just the individual. Burge’s
(1979) social externalism, for example, holds that the content of one’s mental states
can supervene on one’s wider linguistic community; for instance, some mental con-
tent is determined by the relevant experts in our linguistic communities. Thus, vehicle
internalists could be either internalists or externalists about content. The same is true
for vehicle externalists. A vehicle externalist could maintain that the content of men-
tal representations is always determined by the individual, including the individual’s
extended cognitive states and processes—for Otto this would mean both his brain and
his notebook.16 Or, a vehicle externalist could be a content externalist, maintaining
that the content of one’s mental states can supervene on more than just one’s cognitive
16 Lyre (2016, pp. 24, 25) calls this position ‘extended internalism’ because it still accepts the supervenience
claim that content internalists accept. Only the vehicles can be extended, so they might not be brain states
or processes and may instead be external to the skin-and-skull, but the content still supervenes on the
representational vehicles of (or within) the ‘extended’ cognitive system.
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system, wherever that might be. For example, when Otto relies on representations of
the word arthritis in his notebook, this symbol serves as the vehicle for his thoughts
about arthritis (it might appear in a sentence he wrote about how arthritis is inflam-
mation in the joints), but the content of this vehicle is determined by the relevant
experts in his linguistic community. These examples illustrate the common thought
that the vehicle internalist/externalist distinction varies independently of the content
internalist/externalist positions (Chalmers 2008; Theiner 2011).
Now, we can begin our response to Adams and Aizawa’s objection by considering
a further distinction between two kinds of externalism. In addition to describing their
extended mind thesis as a version of vehicle externalism, Clark and Chalmers also label
their view ‘active externalism’. In active externalism the relevant external representa-
tional vehicles play an active role in driving the cognitive process. They contrast this
with Burge’s version of content externalism, which they describe as ‘passive’ because
natural language communities are very large and removed from the cognitive process
of the individual, such that the individual cannot change the overall usage of the words
she uses—even those that occur in thoughts that she has. Recently, Lyre (2016) has
defended the possibility of ‘active content externalism’, where the individual plays an
active role in determining the representational content.17 Lyre asks us to imagine the
case of a very small linguistic community, composed of just a few speakers, where
these speakers are the relevant experts themselves. Using a thought experiment rather
than a real case to support this possibility, Lyre (2016) asks us to ‘[t]hink of a gang of
youth with their own slang’ (p. 29). In this ‘gang-slang’ case the linguistic community
that determines the content of the linguistic symbols is not distant or removed from
the relevant representational vehicles whose content is being determined. Instead, the
members of the group play an active role in determining the content of the slang they
use. For example, let us consider gang member G, who is an active member of the
small linguistic community. G plays a role in determining the content of the external
linguistic symbols that she uses. Let’s imagine further that G graffities a few buildings
with an abstract tag symbol, and subsequently G and the other members of her group
begin to rely on the presence of the tag to represent which parts of the neighbourhood
are safe to them. Over time, G and her group come to depend on these symbols regu-
larly to navigate through their town. Thus, the tag serves as an external vehicle of G’s
cognition, yet the content of this tag was determined in part by G, along with other
members of her small linguistic community.
This case is still fictional and the details have been idealized for the purpose of
illustrating the possibility of active content externalism. But notice that neither G nor
any other member of her group determines the content of the tag by themselves. When
G first draws the tag, its content is not derived from her internal biologically instantiated
mental representations. The vehicle has content, but the community only apprehends
the content via their interaction with the symbol—through this they come to learn
that it represents a safe place for them. The tag, an external representational vehicle,
therefore, has content that is not derived from any preceding biological representations.
A case like this has the potential to demonstrate how external vehicles can have non-
17 Lyre calls this ‘active social externalism’, but to reduce the number of terms we introduce, we will simply
call this ‘active content externalism’. Active social externalism combines the social elements of Burge’s
view with the active elements of Clark and Chalmers’s vehicle externalism.
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derived content. Now, as a real case, we will consider expert mathematicians who
introduce new mathematical symbols and axioms on paper and who, together with
a few other mathematicians, determine the content of the new symbols and axioms
through their external manipulations. The cases we appeal to also emphasize the social
and cultural practices of mathematicians and, thus, demonstrate how new symbols and
axioms can be the product of a process of enculturation.
8 External representations with non-derived content
To make our case for external representations with non-derived content, we will first
defend content externalism with respect to mathematical knowledge, and then defend
vehicle externalism for the case of (at least some) mathematical cognitive processes.
We then turn to the possibility of active content externalism and describe cases where
the content of mathematical symbols is not derived from any internal biologically
instantiated representations.
8.1 Mathematical content externalism and vehicle externalism
For the cognitive integrationist, mathematical practices and concepts are not innate:
they are cultural practices and culturally evolved symbols and systems that are learned
and deployed to complete mathematical cognitive tasks. At a basic level, we all learn
these practices and concepts. But at a certain, higher level of expertise, the community
of mathematicians becomes quite small. These thinkers determine the content of the
symbols that the rest of us rely on. Ferreirós (2015) has recently developed an account
of mathematical practices according to which everyday practices and skills ground
the more abstract, genuinely mathematical practices. The latter are characterized by
the use of symbolic frameworks for the treatment of abstract subjects and the pursuit
of theoretical, as opposed to practical, goals. Accordingly, in terms of Burge’s social
externalism, if expert mathematicians introduce a new property of the number zero, for
instance, that 50  1 or 0!  1 (De Cruz and de Smedt 2013, p. 6), this changes the truth
conditions of our beliefs about zero because the content of our representation of the
number zero is determined by the experts of the relevant community. This establishes
content externalism in the case of mathematical knowledge.
But many have argued that mathematical cognition also provides a strong case
for vehicle externalism. Cognitive integration predicts that spatial properties of the
representations—for instance, the arrangement of numerals—of the external symbols
we manipulate can affect our mathematical cognition (Menary 2015, p. 14). Bear
in mind that external mathematical symbols and their manipulations (in accordance
with some system of rules) are permanent structures even for mature mathematician-
s—they are not impermanent scaffolding used only during learning or developmental
periods. Noting this, consider a study by Landy and Goldstone (2007), which found
that altering the layout of algebraic formulas could cause undergraduate students to
make increased errors. By adding more space between terms that are to be added
than between those that are to be multiplied, subjects were misled about the order in
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which the operations had to be applied and thus were more likely to make mistakes.
These results support the cognitive integration framework, as well as vehicle exter-
nalism more broadly. They certainly show that the spatial layout of symbols affects
our mathematical competence, but they have also been taken as evidence that (some
cases of) mathematical cognition are partially constituted by our manipulation of exter-
nal symbols (Dutilh Novaes 2013; Menary 2015). Additional support for the effect
of external representations on mathematical cognition includes the representational
effects in mental arithmetic. For example, work by Nuerk et al. (2001) shows that peo-
ple consider the units and decades separately when determining which of two numbers
is greater. This explains the surprising phenomenon that 42 < 53 is generally assessed
faster and more accurately than 42 < 61, despite the fact that the numerical distance
between the latter two numbers is greater (see also Nuerk et al. 2015). Such ‘decade
effects’ can also be observed in mental addition tasks, where the time and accuracy for
performing additions of two-digit numerals can be explained by the structure of the
numerals instead of the numerical values of the addends (Neth 2004). These empirical
results show that accidental features of the decimal place-value notation, such as the
fact that nine is represented by a single digit but ten is represented by two digits, are
integrated in our cognitive processes (Schlimm 2018).
8.2 Non-derivedmathematical content
Not only are the symbolic vehicles of representation internalized over time, but they can
also induce new content. For example, Menary (2015, p. 15) notes that once a public
symbolic system for counting numbers is in place, this motivates the introduction of
all sorts of ‘exotic’ numbers and operations that do not have their origin in previous
mental content. The historical introduction of negative numbers, the number zero
(as opposed to a placeholder symbol with no numerical content), complex numbers,
etc., are all instances of this phenomenon. These external public systems allow for
computations that could not be performed by any basic, biologically inherited number
system (Gaber and Schlimm 2015). Recall how the concept of evolutionary continuity,
central to the cognitive integration approach, applies to both cultural and biological
evolutionary processes—this is key, as biology evolves at a pace too slow to explain the
relatively rapid progress in mathematics. Menary (2015) argues that, for example, the
neural circuits responsible for numerosity cannot represent either negative numbers or
square roots. These concepts have to arise in conjunction with the public mathematical
symbols that have been developed to represent them. This is because of the novelty and
uniqueness of these symbolic representations. Novelty, Menary (2015, p. 15) explains,
arises from external pressures, such as social and economic complexities.
A major driving force behind mathematical developments are, in addition to worldly
problems for which a mathematical answer is sought, inner-theoretical pressures (Fer-
reirós 2015). These arise from various theoretical ideals, such as simplifying solution
strategies, using as few assumptions as possible, avoiding unnecessary computations,
and formulating general solutions that are not prone to exceptions. For example, any
two counting numbers (i.e., positive integers), can be added to obtain another such
number, just as any two collections of things can be combined to obtain a larger collec-
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tion. Thus, addition of natural numbers can always be applied without any restrictions.
However, this is not the case for subtraction. While 6 − 2  4, there is no natural num-
ber that expresses the result of subtracting 6 from 2. Analogously, there is no collection
of oranges that represents the result of starting with 2 oranges and taking away 6 of
them. In bookkeeping, this problem was solved by introducing the notions of debit and
credit, both of which could be expressed with natural numbers alone. However, the
desire to formulate a general theory that has as few exceptions as possible led math-
ematicians to the introduction of a symbol for expressing the result of subtracting 6
from 2, namely ‘−4’, and to formulate rules of operation for manipulating this new
kind of symbol in conjunction with those symbols that express natural numbers, for
instance, (−4) + 6  2. In a further step, these new symbols were not only thought
of as being determined by formal rules, but also as referring to abstract entities, just
like the ordinary numerals. In this way, negative numbers came into being, and, with
them, almost any expression of the form x–y became meaningful, with x–x remaining
the only exception. To fill this gap, also zero had to be considered to be a number
and not just a placeholder symbol that signifies the absence of a value. Now, finally,
mathematicians had developed an abstract domain of numbers, the integers, in which
not only addition could be performed without exceptions, but also subtraction. This
development was not driven primarily by social or economic pressures, but by inner-
mathematical, theoretical ones (Corry 2015).
When manipulating algebraic equations, it is generally allowed to perform the same
operation, such as addition, multiplication, and exponentiation, on both sides of an
equation. For example, beginning with x2 + 1  0, subtracting 1 on both sides yields
x2  −1. But which number x can be multiplied with itself to result in negative one?
Algebraists in the sixteenth century, such as Cardano and Bombelli, faced this ques-
tion head on and came to the conclusion that expressions like x √−1 should be
accepted as solutions of algebraic equations, even though the symbolic expression of
the square root of a negative number was considered ‘sophistic’ and ‘as subtle as it
is useless’ (Corry 2015, p. 145). Nevertheless, such expressions proved their worth
in the work of the algebraists and thus gained more and more acceptance. With time,
rules for the operations with such expressions were codified, and the symbolic expres-
sions were simplified by simply writing i for
√−1. Later on, through the use of pairs
of real numbers and operations on these pairs, the new expressions could be sys-
tematically related to better understood mathematical objects and they were granted
the status of numbers—imaginary ones. In short, by relying on culturally established
rules for manipulating mathematical expressions, mathematicians introduced sym-
bolic expressions that were not imbued with some prior mental content. However,
once such expressions proved their worth in a practice, for example by facilitating
the solution of algebraic equations, new ideas were sought to fill them with content.
Nowadays, i and
√−1 have the same content, although this content was not fully
understood by early users of these symbols, including the expert mathematicians who
introduced them in the first place. The development of imaginary numbers is thus
an example of how mathematicians sometimes introduce new symbols to represent
new mathematical possibilities that are not yet understood. Krämer (2003) calls this
process ‘operative writing’: what the notation represents—that is, the content of the
symbol(s)—is constituted by the symbol itself and its interaction with other symbols.
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This is especially persuasive in cases where new symbols are introduced and manipu-
lated within an established practice but in ways that were not anticipated before, such
as subtracting a larger number from a smaller, taking the root of a negative number, or
raising to the power where the exponent is a fraction or a real number (De Cruz and
de Smedt 2013).
It is interesting to notice how the case of a mathematician who introduces a new
symbol and who, together with a few other expert mathematicians in their small com-
munity, comes to develop an understanding of the content of the new symbol by
manipulating it in accordance with their agreed-upon practice and transformation rules
is parallel to the gang-slang case given above. Both are cases of active content exter-
nalism. The key difference from the gang-slang case is that these mathematical cases
are not hypothetical but are recurring episodes in the history of mathematics. Such
cases of operative writing, thus, challenge not only the objection from non-derived
content but also Adams and Aizawa’s position of contingent intracranialism.
8.3 Non-Euclidean geometries
The examples of the introduction of new mathematical domains discussed in the
previous section were all motivated by the desire to apply arithmetical operations,
such as subtraction and the taking of roots, without any of the restrictions imposed on
them in the realm of whole numbers. We have argued that these extensions resulted
from first introducing new symbols and then imbuing them with meanings and that
the new mathematical content should be considered to be non-derived, because the
external symbolic representations were prior to the mathematical conceptions that
followed them. We now present a different case that is not based on domain extension,
namely the introduction of non-Euclidean geometries.18
For over 2000 years after the publication of Euclid’s Elements, his axioms and
theorems were considered to express geometric truths about the world. Most of the
foundational research in geometry in the wake of Euclid was concerned with finding
alternative axiomatizations with simpler and fewer axioms. In particular, his fifth pos-
tulate, also called ‘parallel postulate’ (Euclid distinguished between common notions
and postulates, instead of talking about axioms), attracted a lot of attention from
commentators from early on (Heath 1956, pp. 202–220). It states that ‘if a straight
line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on the same side less than
two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on
which are the angles less than the two right angles’ (as quoted in Heath 1956, p. 202).
It already stands out from the remaining axioms of Euclid by the complexity of its
formulation, and so mathematicians tried to simplify it or to prove it from the other
axioms. This history is very well known, so we skip many details and simply sketch
the main development. One way of showing that a statement follows from some given
assumptions is by an indirect proof (proof by contradiction), that is, to assume the
contrary of the statement together with the given assumptions and derive a contradic-
tion. Accordingly, mathematicians, such as Saccheri, started by assuming the contrary
of the parallel postulate, something that they wholeheartedly believed to be false. In
18 This is an example of the creative use of axioms by modification (Schlimm 2011, 2013).
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other words, they thought that their assumptions taken together would be contradic-
tory and thus they would have no content whatsoever. However, in the course of these
investigations, all contradictions that were found were shown to be based on faulty
reasoning; over time, the belief that the system of assumptions was indeed contradic-
tory became weaker and weaker, and mathematicians such as Gauss, Lobachevsky,
and Bolyai became convinced that this system was actually consistent after all. They
talked about lines and planes for which the parallel postulate did not hold and deduced
theorems about them. Later, Beltrami, Klein, and Poincaré all showed how these ‘non-
Euclidean’ objects could be systematically related to the familiar Euclidean points,
lines, and planes. By the end of the nineteenth century, non-Euclidean geometries were
accepted as genuine mathematical domains (Gray 2008).
What the development of non-Euclidean geometries illustrates is a case where
statements thought to express no mathematical content gradually became accepted
vehicles of content. The fact that formal derivations from these assumptions did not
lead to any contradictions suggested their contents. Unlike the examples in the previous
section, non-Euclidean geometries do not extend Euclidean geometry but are in fact
incompatible with it, which contributed to a radical change in mathematical ontology
(Gray 1992). The linguistic community of mathematicians who developed the theories
of non-Euclidean geometry in the nineteenth century was relatively small, and they
were themselves the experts regarding the content of the axiom systems they were
studying, again just like in the gang-slang case. Indeed, many philosophers were
not familiar with the work of these experts; they continued to rely on their a priori
conceptions of geometry and thus failed to grasp the content introduced by these novel
developments. Thus, we may speak here of an example of active content externalism.
9 Discussion of the notion of derived content
In introducing the distinction between derived and non-derived content, Adams and
Aizawa (2001, p. 48) consider the case of numerals and describe them as having
derived content: ‘Numerals of various sorts represent the numbers they do in virtue
of social agreements and practices.’ Adams and Aizawa might, therefore, dismiss the
examples we have given of numerals and postulates by arguing that they derive their
content from convention or social practice. This brings out an important distinction
between two senses of ‘derived’ content that Adams and Aizawa use. They say that
non-cognitive representational states derive their meanings either (1) from represen-
tational states with intrinsic content—therefore genuinely cognitive representational
states, or (2) from conventions or social practices. On the first definition, a symbol
with derived content owes its meaning to an act of interpretation by an agent who has
cognitive states bearing intrinsic content—states that do not need to be interpreted and
that mean what they do independent of other representational states. On the second
definition, the contents of non-cognitive representational states represent in virtue of
convention or social practices, unlike non-derived content, which is supposed to be
naturalistic and non-conventional (Piredda 2017). Adams and Aizawa do not clearly
distinguish these two definitions of derived content—we have mentioned both of these
definitions in our earlier introduction of derived content, but we have not carefully dis-
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tinguished them until now.19 In the cases we described, the content of newly introduced
symbols might come to be understood through the manipulations of the symbols in
accordance with agreed-upon social practices, but their content cannot be derivative
of any internal biologically instantiated representational states or processes, as the
symbols are introduced originally without any clear internal understanding of their
representational content, and their content is determined only by the syntactic manip-
ulations that can be performed with them. Hence, we have shown that mathematical
symbols are not derived in the first sense, and the objection we now consider is whether
they are derived in the second sense, that is, derived from conventional associations
or social practices. We will offer several responses to this objection.
First, if the distinction between derived and non-derived content is based only on
the second definition, this seems to beg the question against the possibility of exter-
nal symbols with non-derived content. Without an explanation as to how naturalistic
content is possible, the claim that all and only biologically instantiated vehicles of rep-
resentation have non-derived content, coupled with the claim that non-derived content
is the mark of the cognitive, takes a position on the very question at hand—that is,
where the vehicles of cognitive representations can be located. Even if there is con-
sensus that neural representations do not depend on an act of interpretation to acquire
meaning, the contingent intracranialists, without an explanation as to how this is the
case, risk assuming what they are arguing for. They cannot simply assert a priori that
all private representations, or internal representations, will have intrinsic content, and
all representations external will have non-derived content (Prinz and Clark 2004; Clark
2005). As we have said, offering a naturalistic account of content continues to be a
big issue in philosophy of cognitive science, although attempts have been made by
Dretske (1981, 1988), Fodor (1987, 1990), Millikan (1984), and others.
Another way to push back on Adams and Aizawa’s assertion that all and only
biologically instantiated vehicles of representation have non-derived content is to argue
that at least some internal representations acquire their meaning through convention.
We can imagine someone who relies on an internal ‘mental picture’ of words, such as
‘dog’, in her thinking about dogs. This linguistic representation derives its meaning by
convention, and, yet, it occurs internally. Clark (2005, p. 5) gives the example of ‘an
episode of in-the-head problem solving during which [one] imagine[s] the partially
overlapping circles of a certain Venn diagram. Surely the set-theoretic meaning of this
overlap is a matter of convention? Yet the images figure centrally in what is surely a
cognitive process in good standing.’ Also, the empirical results discussed in Sect. 8.2,
where the performance in mental arithmetic tasks clearly depends on the structure
of the external decimal-place value notation of numerals, illustrate this point. In all
of these cases, biologically instantiated representational vehicles have content that
is derived by convention, yet we call these relevant information-bearing structures
cognitive because they are located in the brain—this neuro-chauvinistic attitude is
motivating the contingent intracranialist position.
Finally, we suggest that a further distinction needs to be made between two ways in
which a symbol can have content through convention: (a) by being assigned some pre-
19 Neither does Clark (2005) in his reply to Adams and Aizawa, nor do secondary commentators, such as
Piredda (2017), make the distinction between the two kinds of derived content.
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viously given content, and (b) where the content itself emerges from social conventions
about the use of the symbol. In the first case, an arbitrary symbol is assigned a given
content and a convention is established to use that symbol to represent that content. An
example is the linguistic representation for dog, namely, the word ‘dog’. Furthermore,
a social practice is established within a particular community—English speakers—to
use ‘dog’ to refer to a dog. This case is importantly different from the mathematical
cases we have described, which are instances of symbols that emerge from social
conventions. In the cases of −4 and i, the symbols were introduced before the content
of the symbols was determined. In other words, there was no prior content that was
assigned to the symbols −4 and i; rather this content had to emerge from the symbolic
practice of manipulating the symbols through the process of operative writing and by
linking them to other mathematical domains. Thus, in these cases, the content itself
stems from the social practices, an aspect of the process of enculturation, that are exter-
nal to any individual thinker and that guide the manner of manipulating mathematical
symbols. Likewise, non-Euclidean geometries emerged from the explicit rejection
of an established convention—Euclid’s parallel postulate—and emerged through the
cognitive practices of mathematicians, who themselves believed the contrary of the
parallel postulate to be false, or void of mathematical content. Reluctantly, through
mathematical manipulations, they came to see that they were mistaken. These cases
are importantly different from how other external symbols acquire content through
convention and, we argue, they provide a case in which the content of external sym-
bols precedes any conventional association or any act of interpretation by a cognitive
agent.
10 Conclusion
Menary’s theory of cognitive integration is a version of vehicle externalism and, as
such, it faces a longstanding objection to vehicle externalism as raised by Adams and
Aizawa. Their objection from non-derived content claims (a) that non-derived content
is a mark of the cognitive and (b) that, as a matter of contingent fact, no external
vehicles of representations can have non-derived content. We have argued against the
second claim, demonstrating instead that there are cases in mathematics where external
symbols have content that is not derived either from conventional associations or from
the representational states of a cognitive agent.
While Menary considers mathematical cognition as a primary example of the
process of enculturation, which is a central aspect of his cognitive integrationist frame-
work, he does not develop this view as a response to the objection from non-derived
content. This has been our aim in this paper. Our response to the objection relied on two
sorts of historical cases: the first demonstrates how expert mathematicians introduce
new symbols to represent mathematical possibilities that are not yet understood; the
second case moves away from what could be considered mere domain extensions and
instead shows the development of an entirely new domain, non-Euclidean geometry,
that was premised on the rejection of previously established mathematical assump-
tions. These cases are examples of what we call active content externalism—they show
how a symbol can drive understanding, even when the content of the symbol is not
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yet understood by those who introduce it. If correct our argument would establish that
there are at least some cases of external representations with non-derived content and,
hence, that vehicle externalism is possible (though it would not be a defense of all of
the popular examples of vehicles externalism, such as the case Otto’s notebook).
We ended by considering a possible objection, namely, that our examples of exter-
nal symbols have content that is derived by convention and social practices, rather
than being derived in the sense of requiring an act of interpretation. In response to this
we argued, first, that this sense of ‘derived’ may beg the question and, second, that
there are in fact two senses in which content can be determined by convention—one in
which an understood content is somewhat arbitrarily assigned to a symbol and subse-
quently a convention is established; and another in which a new symbol is introduced
without a known content and social practices then come to determine that content.
The second sense of ‘derived’, we argue, is far more interesting and should be used
for genuine cases of non-derived content; we illustrated such cases in our examples
of mathematical symbols and axioms. If we are right, then we have grounds to reject
Adams and Aizawa’s position of contingent intracranialism. As a consequence, the
onus would now fall on the embedded mind theorist, who supports intracranialism, to
find a principled reason for rejecting vehicle externalist views, such as the extended
mind thesis and the theory of cognitive integration.
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